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Re: [sig-policy] [Sig-policy][Draft announcement]prop-050: IPv4 addresstransfers



Hi, I have two clarification question about this proposal.

 1. Is it correct in assuming historical resouces currently under APNIC
is also *included* in the scope for the transfer?
    Was a little confused by the phrase "(non-historical)"below:
   ----
   It proposes that APNIC will recognise and register a transfer of
   addresses where the parties to the transfer are 'known' to APNIC and
   that the address block being transferred is part of APNIC's current
   (non-historical) address set
   -----

 2. Does this proposal seek to allow inter-RIR transfers if it reaches
consensus in other RIRs as well?

Looking forward to confirm the answers.


thanks,
izumi

zhangjian wrote:
>  
> 
> Dear SIG members
> 
>  
> 
> An updated version of the proposal 'IPv4 address transfers' has been sent to
> the Policy SIG for review. It will be presented at the Policy SIG at APNIC
> 26 in Christchurch, New Zealand, 25-29 August 2008.
> 
>  
> 
> The proposal's history can be found at:
> 
>  
> 
>       http://www.apnic.net/policy/proposals/prop-050-v003.html
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> This new version of the proposal has expanded commentaries in sections 2 and
> 5. Section 3 now includes a reference to the transfer proposal under
> discussion in the ARIN region.
> 
>  
> 
> We invite you to review and comment on the proposal on the mailing list
> before the meeting.
> 
>  
> 
> The comment period on the mailing list before an APNIC meeting is an
> important part of the policy development process. We encourage you to
> express your views on the proposal:
> 
>  
> 
>       - Do you support or oppose this proposal?
> 
>  
> 
>       - Does this proposal solve a problem you are experiencing? If so,
> 
>         tell the community about your situation.
> 
>  
> 
>       - Do you see any disadvantages in this proposal?
> 
>  
> 
>       - Is there anything in the proposal that is not clear?
> 
>  
> 
>       - What changes could be made to this proposal to make it more
> 
>         effective?
> 
>  
> 
> randy and jian
> 
>  
> 
> ________________________________________________________________________
> 
>  
> 
> prop-050-v003: IPv4 address transfers
> 
> ________________________________________________________________________
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> Author:    Geoff Huston
> 
>             gih@apnic.net
> 
>  
> 
> Version:   3
> 
>  
> 
> Date:      22 July 2008
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 1.  Introduction
> 
> ----------------
> 
>  
> 
> This is a proposal to amend APNIC policy restrictions on the transfer of
> registration of IPv4 address allocations and IPv4 portable address
> assignments between current APNIC account holders. This proposal is a
> refinement of the historical resource transfer policy and applies to
> 
> IPv4 resources held by current APNIC account holders.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 2.  Summary of current problem
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
>  
> 
> Current APNIC policies relating to the registration of transfer of address
> holdings limit the eligibility of registration of transfers to those
> relating to mergers and acquisitions of entities that are administering an
> operational network.
> 
>  
> 
> It is currently anticipated that the IPv4 unallocated address pool will be
> exhausted in a timeframe of between 2009 and 2011. There is a very
> considerable level of investment in IPv4-based services in the Asia Pacific
> region, and a transition to IPv6-based service delivery is likely to take
> longer than the remaining period of unallocated address availability.
> Accordingly, it is likely that demand for IPv4 addresses will continue
> beyond the time of unallocated address pool exhaustion, leading to a period
> of movement of IPv4 address blocks between address holders to meet such
> continuing demand for IPv4 address blocks.
> 
>  
> 
> It is the objective of the APNIC IPv4 address registry to accurately record
> current address distribution information.
> 
>  
> 
> This proposal allows APNIC to recognise the transfer of IPv4 addresses
> between current APNIC account holders, and places some constraints on the
> parties to the transfer as a precondition for the registration of the IPv4
> address transfer to be undertaken by APNIC.
> 
>  
> 
> The underlying assumptions behind this policy proposal are:
> 
>  
> 
>     - There will continue to be need for additional IPv4 address
> 
>       resources in the AP region after the exhaustion of the APNIC
> 
>       IPv4 unallocated address pool
> 
>  
> 
>     - The amount of returned address space to APNIC will not meet
> 
>       those needs
> 
>  
> 
>     - Some IPv4 address holders will be in a position to release
> 
>       address space and convert to NAT or similar solutions if they
> 
>       are given some level of incentive
> 
>  
> 
>     - Some amount of transfer of address space will occur in the
> 
>       APNIC region following the exhaustion of the unallocated IPv4
> 
>       address pool
> 
>  
> 
>     - The registry of IPv4 addresses operated by APNIC is of general
> 
>       utility and value only while it accurately describes the current
> 
>       state of address distribution. If a class of address movement
> 
>       transactions are excluded from being entered in the registry,
> 
>       then the registry will have decreasing value to the broader
> 
>       community.
> 
>  
> 
> This proposal's central aim is to ensure the continuing utility and value of
> the APNIC address registry by allowing the registry to record transactions
> where IPv4 addresses are transfered between APNIC account holders.
> 
>  
>
> 
>  
> 
> The proposal does not:
> 
>  
> 
>     - Prescribe how such transfers may occur, nor
> 
>  
> 
>     - Impose any further constraints on the transfer or on the parties
> 
>       involved.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 3.   Situation in other RIRs
> 
> ----------------------------
> 
>  
> 
> Proposals for address transfers similar to this proposal are being discussed
> at the following RIRs:
> 
>  
> 
>     RIPE
> 
>  
> 
>         2007-08: Enabling Methods for Reallocation of IPv4 Resources
> 
>         http://www.ripe.net/ripe/policies/proposals/2007-08.html
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>     ARIN
> 
>  
> 
>         Policy Proposal 2008-2: IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal
> 
>         http://www.arin.net/policy/proposals/2008_2.html
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 4.   Details of the proposal
> 
> ----------------------------
> 
>  
> 
> APNIC will process IPv4 address transfer requests following the adoption of
> this proposed policy, subject to the following conditions:
> 
>  
> 
> Conditions on the IPv4 address block:
> 
>  
> 
>     - Only IPv4 address blocks equal to, or larger than, a /24 prefix
> 
>       may be transferred.
> 
>  
> 
>     - The address block must be in the range of addresses administered
> 
>       by APNIC, either as part of a /8 address block assigned by the
> 
>       IANA to APNIC, or as part of a historically-assigned address
> 
>       block now administered by APNIC.
> 
>  
> 
>     - The address block must be allocated or assigned to a current
> 
>       APNIC account holder.
> 
>  
> 
>     - The address block will be subject to all current APNIC policies
> 
>       from the time of transfer. This includes address blocks
> 
>       previously considered to be "historical".
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> Conditions on source of the transfer:
> 
>  
> 
>     - The source entity must be a current APNIC account holder.
> 
>  
> 
>     - The source entity must be the currently registered holder of the
> 
>       IPv4 address resources, and not be involved in any dispute as to
> 
>       the status of those resources.
> 
>  
> 
>     - The source entity will be ineligible to receive any further IPv4
> 
>       address allocations or assignments from APNIC for a period of 24
> 
>       months after the transfer.
> 
>  
> 
>     - In making any future IPv4 address resource requests to APNIC,
> 
>       for as long as IPv4 address resources are available from APNIC,
> 
>       following the expiration of this 24 month ineligibility
> 
>       period, the source will be required to document the reasons for
> 
>       the IPv4 address resource allocation.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> Conditions on recipient of the transfer:
> 
>  
> 
>     - The recipient entity must be a current APNIC account holder.
> 
>  
> 
>     - The recipient entity of the transferred resources will be
> 
>       subject to current APNIC policies. In particular, in any
> 
>       subsequent APNIC IPv4 address allocation request, the recipient
> 
>       will be required to account for all IPv4 address space held,
> 
>       including all transferred resources.
> 
>  
> 
>     - APNIC fees payable by the recipient will be assessed on the
> 
>       basis of all resources held.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> The address transfer process:
> 
>  
> 
>     After APNIC is notified of the transfer by both the source and the
> 
>     recipient of the transfer:
> 
>  
> 
>     1. APNIC will update the registration records relating to the
> 
>        transferred addresses.
> 
>  
> 
>     2. APNIC will adjust the source's address holdings as of the date
> 
>        of transfer.
> 
>  
> 
>        In terms of membership and/or service fee calculations this
> 
>        shall be processed in the same manner as a return of address
> 
>        holdings to APNIC as of that date.
> 
>  
> 
>     3. APNIC will adjust the recipient's address holdings to include
> 
>        the transferred addresses as of the date of the transfer.
> 
>  
> 
>        In terms of membership and/or service fee calculations this
> 
>        shall be processed in the same manner as an allocation or
> 
>        assignment of address holdings to the recipient as of that date.
> 
>  
> 
>        In order to preserve aggregation capabilities the transfer
> 
>        recipient may notify APNIC that the transferred address may be
> 
>        returned to the unallocated APNIC address pool, and a different
> 
>        address of the same size may be registered to the recipient of
> 
>        the transfer. This option would be available to the recipient
> 
>        of the transferred address, at the discretion of the recipient,
> 
>        and subject to availablility of an alternate address block from
> 
>        APNIC
> 
>  
> 
>     4. The following transfer details will be published by APNIC in a
> 
>        public log of resource transfers:
> 
>  
> 
>        - Source
> 
>        - Recipient
> 
>        - Address resources
> 
>        - Date of transfer
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> Transfer fees:
> 
>  
> 
>     APNIC may charge the recipient a service fee on the transfer
> 
>     transaction. The transfer service fee may vary according to the
> 
>     total size of the address block being transferred.
> 
>  
> 
>     The transfer fee schedule shall be set initially by the APNIC
> 
>     Executive Council upon adoption of this policy.  The transfer fee
> 
>     schedule will be included as part of any future review of APNIC
> 
>     fees and charges.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 5.   Advantages and disadvantages of the proposal
> 
> -------------------------------------------------
> 
>  
> 
> 5.1 Advantages
> 
>  
> 
> This proposal, by acknowledging the existence of address transfers and
> registering the outcomes, would ensure that the APNIC address registry
> continues to maintain accurate data about resources and resource holders.
> The proposal also ensures that those parties who currently rely on the
> accuracy of this registration information can continue to rely on the
> currency and accuracy of this information in good faith. In particular, it
> would:
> 
>  
> 
>     - Ensure that the APNIC registry continues to reflect the current
> 
>       actual status of IPv4 resource holdings by APNIC account holders.
> 
>  
> 
>     - Mitigate the risks to the integrity of the network, and its routing
> 
>       and addressing infrastructure in particular, associated with the
> 
>       unregistered transfers of IPv4 addresses.
> 
>  
> 
>     - Provide a stronger incentive for unused IPv4 address space to
> 
>       return to active use, helping to satisfy residual demand for IPv4
> 
>       address space across the IPv6 transition.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 5.2 Disadvantages (and responses)
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 5.2.1 Altering the traditional concepts of IP addresses
> 
>  
> 
>        This proposal has the potential to alter a number of traditional
> 
>        preconceptions relating to addresses and their value, including
> 
>        challenging the concept that addresses are not in and of
> 
>        themselves assets and addresses do no in and of themselves have
> 
>        monetary value outside of the narrow constraints of use in
> 
>        networks for routing and end point identification. Changing these
> 
>        common percpetions about addresses and their use opens up the
> 
>        potential for a number of responses, including:
> 
>  
> 
>        - The loss of strong aggregation capability in the address space,
> 
>          with the consequent load being imposed on the routing system.
> 
>  
> 
>        - The significant shift away from a universal need-based address
> 
>          allocation model in the underlying policy framework.
> 
>  
> 
>        - The treatment of addresses as property with the associated legal
> 
>          ramifications in terms of corporate and contract law.
> 
>  
> 
>        - The imposition of taxes on addresses and their movement.
> 
>  
> 
>        - The potential for unfairness and inequities to be realized in
> 
>          terms of access to addresses for use by network service
> 
>          providers.
> 
>  
> 
>        Response:
> 
>  
> 
>            A number of factors mitigate the risks above:
> 
>  
> 
>            - As the transition to IPv6 gathers pace, any residual value
> 
>              of IPv4 addresses would fall in line with the decreasing
> 
>              value proposition of IPv4-based services in an increasing
> 
>              IPv6 network.
> 
>  
> 
>            - If this policy were to be adopted while IPv4 addresses are
> 
>              still available from APNIC, APNIC's established IPv4 address
> 
>              allocation process would continue to provide an alternative
> 
>              source of supply of IPv4 addresses to the industry.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 5.2.2 Proposal diverts attention from address reclamation and resuse
> 
>  
> 
>        It has been argued that the proposal diverts attention from policy
> 
>        development that encourages IP address reclamation and reuse.
> 
>  
> 
>        Response:
> 
>  
> 
>            To date the level of return and reclamation of addresses has
> 
>            been minimal. Aside from price-based mechanisms it is unclear
> 
>            that further policy refinement would alter this situation.
> 
>  
> 
>            Even if policy development encouraged address reclamation and
> 
>            reuse, there is the distinct possibility that the amount
> 
>            reclaimed addresses would be smaller than the amount needed
> 
>            for APNIC to continue to allocate addresses on a needs-basis
> 
>            after the unallocated address pool has been exhausted.
> 
>  
> 
>            An open and significant issue is how APNIC could fairly ration
> 
>            limited addresses when faced with a much larger set of
> 
>            demands. In other words, concentrating on relamation and reuse
> 
>            policies rather than transfer policies also contains
> 
>            significant issues that may prove challenging to resolve as a
> 
>            policy matter.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 5.2.3 Potential for APNIC to be cast as a regulator
> 
>  
> 
>        If APNIC adopted this policy, APNIC may be cast as a regulator
> 
>        of a secondary market in addresses. Concerns have been expressed
> 
>        that APNIC has no experience, expertise nor the authority to
> 
>        enforce regulatory actions. Such a role may also expose APNIC to
> 
>        additional litigation.
> 
>  
> 
>        Response:
> 
>  
> 
>            This proposal does not advocate such a role for APNIC. The
> 
>            scope of this policy is explicitly limited to the conditions
> 
>            that would allow APNIC to recognise and record a transfer of
> 
>            addresses in its registry.
> 
>  
> 
>            There is a general belief that adoption of this policy would
> 
>            act as an incentive for a market in addresses. However, that
> 
>            does not imply that markets would act outside existing
> 
>            regulatory structures.  Nor does it mean that market
> 
>            participants would be immune from existing regulatory measures
> 
>            within their respective regimes.
> 
>  
> 
>            The potential for additional liabilities associated with this
> 
>            policy should be the subject of legal review by an
> 
>            appropriately qualified party.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 5.3 Summary of comments on transfer proposals
> 
>  
> 
> There are a number of views of this that have been noted in the various
> policy discussions on this topic in the various RIR policy forums. The APNIC
> policy proposal is broadly similar to a policy proposal under consideration
> in RIPE, which is referred to here as a "minimal' policy for address
> transfers. The address transfer proposal currently under consideration in
> ARIN has a larger set of constraints to be applied to determine if a
> transfer would be recognised by the registry. A summary of the discussion of
> the differences in these policy proposals follows.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 5.3.1 In favor of a 'minimal' policy
> 
>  
> 
>        - The policy places APNIC in the role of a 'title office' for
> 
>          addresses, and ensures that APNIC, as a registry operator, is
> 
>          neutral in terms of the means used by APNIC members to determine
> 
>          that they wish to proceed with a transfer of addresses.  As long
> 
>          as the criteria for a valid transfer are met, by whatever means
> 
>          agreed to by the parties involved, then the registry should
> 
>          allow the transaction to be duly recorded.
> 
>  
> 
>        - APNIC has no practical operational experience in the area of
> 
>          enforcing various constraints on parties as to how and why
> 
>          addresses may be transferred, and does not currently have any
> 
>          recognized authority to do so.  Making policy in the absence of
> 
>          a well understood and commonly accepted authority model calls
> 
>          into question the legitimacy and authority of outcome.
> 
>  
> 
>        - Regulation is a well understood and familiar concept in many, if
> 
>          not all, regimes. If there is a general desire to place
> 
>          constraint and regulate the actions of parties who wish to
> 
>          undertake a transfer of addresses, then it may be preferred to
> 
>          do so in the context of a broader framework that involves other
> 
>          bodies and authorities that have a greater level of experience
> 
>          and authority in this area of activity, and leverage from
> 
>          existing regulatory structures and enforcement mechanisms. In
> 
>          this manner the policy proposal does not attempt to create a
> 
>          novel, and potentially superfluous additional regulatory
> 
>          framework.
> 
>  
> 
>        - APNIC has no experience in determining what actions by potential
> 
>          parties to a transfer may need to be constrained in some
> 
>          fashion. Attempting to create policy in anticipation of the need
> 
>          for such constraints is going to be a guessing game that has
> 
>          accompanying flaws, Irrespective of what constraints are
> 
>          initially specified in policy, it will be the case that as the
> 
>          levels of experience in this form of activity increases some
> 
>          iterations over the policy of constraints will be necessary in
> 
>          any case. This approach argues to start from a position that is
> 
>          relatively open and unrestricted, and recommend that APNIC
> 
>          impose additional constraints only when all other forms of
> 
>          constraint are inapplicable and there is a clear need and common
> 
>          desire for such constraints to be enforced by APNIC as distinct
> 
>          from using another party for such a role.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 5.3.2 In favour of applying a greater level on constraint in the policy
> 
>  
> 
>        - APNIC has no practical operational experience in address
> 
>          transfers, so we should take incremental steps form the current
> 
>          position rather than a complete relaxation of the entire set of
> 
>          constraints associated with the existing allocation
> 
>          framework. Recipients of a transfer should be qualified by the
> 
>          registry on the basis of demonstrated need in the same fashion
> 
>          as recipient of address allocations today. Address blocks should
> 
>          not be arbitrarily fragmented. Timing constraints should be
> 
>          applied to stop transfers of addresses occurring that are
> 
>          primarily motivated by reasons other than immediate need for use
> 
>          in deployed networks.
> 
>  
> 
>        - Constraints that are generally considered to be onerous and
> 
>          unnecessary can always be removed at a later date, while
> 
>          applying and enforcing additional constraints at a later date
> 
>          will prove to be a far harder task.
> 
>  
> 
>        - There are a number of technical risks associated with address
> 
>          trading. Unconstrained deaggregation will lead to a fracture of
> 
>          the routing system due to unconstrained and large scale
> 
>          expansion of the inter-domain routing table. This is an
> 
>          irreversible state.
> 
>  
> 
> 5.3.3  Discussions of the emergence of a market
> 
>  
> 
>         The various comments made on this and the related address
> 
>         transfer policy proposals provides grounds for the observation
> 
>         that there is a general perception that the recognition of
> 
>         address transfers leads to a de facto recognition of the
> 
>         emergence of a market or markets for IPv4 addresses. A related
> 
>         topic of discussion about the merits or otherwise of these
> 
>         proposals has been the consideration of the relative merits and
> 
>         risks of market behaviours when applied to this situation.
> 
>  
> 
>         The comments opposed to the emergence of markets include the
> 
>         following:
> 
>  
> 
>         - Markets in addresses are an inevitable consequence of a
> 
>           transfer policy, and unconstrained markets are prone to a
> 
>           number of risks of distortion. These risks include deceptive
> 
>           trading, margin trading, trading in market derivatives and
> 
>           futures, hoarding, and speculation. The utility of an address
> 
>           as a token for addressing a packet is devalued in a market
> 
>           situation.
> 
>  
> 
>         - Operation of a market will lock out all but the largest of
> 
>           players in the network from access to further addresses, as the
> 
>           value of the address will be set by the bidder with the highest
> 
>           price and the ability to exploit the address to its maximal
> 
>           extent.
> 
>  
> 
>         - The operation of a market in IPv4 addresses will lead to the
> 
>           erosion of the effectiveness of self-imposed policies in IPv6,
> 
>           and may lead to the emergence of a market in IPv6 addresses.
> 
>  
> 
>         - Markets are unfair in terms of the implicit bias of a market in
> 
>           favour of those parties who are in a position to set the market
> 
>           price, and inherently discriminating against those parties who
> 
>           do not have the capacity to pay. In an international context
> 
>           this is counter to the general objective of a generally
> 
>           available, neutral and non-discriminatory communications
> 
>           infrastructure.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>         Comments in favour of the emergence of a market in IPv4 addresses
> 
>         include:
> 
>  
> 
>         - Address exhaustion poses an insoluble problem to the address
> 
>           registries in that for as long as there is a continuing demand
> 
>           for addresses the registries have no means to meet that demand.
> 
>           Markets create a means for addresses to be recycled, and create
> 
>           a means for the various levels of demand and supply of
> 
>           addresses in IPv4 to reach a balance through a market-based
> 
>           pricing mechanism.
> 
>  
> 
>         - At every stage there is always an alternative to bidding for
> 
>           IPv4 addresses in the context of a market transaction: namely
> 
>           the use of IPv6 within the network, and the use of an upstream
> 
>           protocol translation service to provide legacy access to other
> 
>           IPv4 networks. Given that substitutes exist, the potential
> 
>           price of IPv4 addresses in a market is capped by the cost of
> 
>           deployment of IPv6 and IPv4 transitional mechanisms.
> 
>  
> 
>         - This is a temporary measure during the dual stack phase of
> 
> IPv6
> 
>           transition. The higher the market price for IPv4 addresses the
> 
>           greater the cost pressure placed on the industry to undertake
> 
>           the IPv6 transition, which in turn limits the lifetime of the
> 
>           market and the speculative potential of any such market.
> 
>           Players will have an incentive to act quickly in terms of
> 
>           releasing address resources into such a market given that
> 
>           withholding for too long will result in no return as the market
> 
>           will naturally terminate once IPv6 transition has reached a
> 
>           critical deployment mass.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>         It should be noted that this address transfer policy proposal is
> 
>         mute on the topic of a market for address transfers, and neither
> 
>         advocates nor specifically opposes the emergence of any such
> 
>         market or markets. The policy constrains itself to enumeration of
> 
>         the set of constraints that would apply for APNIC to recognise
> 
>         and register a transfer of addresses between APNIC members. How
> 
>         those parties arrived at the decision to undertake the transfer,
> 
>         and the related issues concerning property, financial and legal
> 
>         frameworks and the emergence of markets, the need to regulate
> 
>         such markets and identification of the market regulator are
> 
>         specifically not encompassed by this policy proposal, nor does
> 
>         this proposal advocate that such a role be undertaken by APNIC.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 6.   Effect on APNIC members
> 
> ----------------------------
> 
>  
> 
> APNIC members will have the ability to register the transfer of IPv4 address
> resources between APNIC members.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 7.   Effect on NIRs
> 
> -------------------
> 
>  
> 
> This policy does not encompass IPv4 address holdings administered by NIRs,
> nor the transfer of resources where the source or recipient are NIR-serviced
> entities.
> 
>  
> 
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> 
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> 
>  
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> 
> 
> 
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> 
> *              sig-policy:  APNIC SIG on resource management policy           *
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