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Hi Gordon,
I know you are including your traceroute as an example, but the example given is not correct. The address space you refer to as "dark" below from hop 15 onwards is in fact legitimately allocated.
> 15 210.180.97.21 1091ms 1219ms 828ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> 16 210.220.73.2 105ms 86ms 50ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> 17 211.108.63.146 96ms 96ms 76ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> 18 221.139.106.58 93ms 63ms 67ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> 19 222.233.52.27 75ms 94ms 76ms TTL: 49 (No rDNS)
> It is also interesting to note the infrastructure this has from hop #15 through hop #19. They are >all dark address space, all APNIC IP addresses. I have published this before several weeks >ago and nothing has happened.
All address space in the hops 15-19 has been allocated to the National Internet Registry (NIR) for Korea - KRNIC and further allocated by them to an LIR in KR. In this case, Hanaro Telecom is the LIR.
Appended below is the 'whois' output from 'whois.apnic.net' for this address space hop 15:
inetnum: 210.180.32.0 - 210.180.223.255
netname: KRNIC-KR
descr: KRNIC
descr: Korea Network Information Center
country: KR
admin-c: HM127-AP
tech-c: HM127-AP
remarks: ******************************************
remarks: KRNIC is the National Internet Registry
remarks: in Korea under APNIC. If you would like to
remarks: find assignment information in detail
remarks: please refer to the KRNIC Whois DB
remarks: http://whois.nic.or.kr/english/index.html
remarks: ******************************************
mnt-by: APNIC-HM
mnt-lower: MNT-KRNIC-AP
changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 19981124
changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20010606
changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20040319
status: ALLOCATED PORTABLE
source: APNIC
person: Host Master
address: 11F, KTF B/D, 1321-11, Seocho2-Dong, Seocho-Gu,
address: Seoul, Korea, 137-857
country: KR
phone: +82-2-2186-4500
fax-no: +82-2-2186-4496
e-mail: hostmaster@nic.or.kr
nic-hdl: HM127-AP
mnt-by: MNT-KRNIC-AP
changed: hostmaster@nic.or.kr 20020507
source: APNIC
inetnum: 210.180.97.0 - 210.180.98.255
netname: HANANET-INFRA-KR
descr: Hanaro Telecom Inc.
descr: Shindongah Bldg., 43 Taepyeongno2-Ga Jung-Gu
descr: SEOUL
descr: 100-733
country: KR
admin-c: IA11935-KR
tech-c: IM11881-KR
remarks: This IP address space has been allocated to KRNIC.
remarks: For more information, using KRNIC Whois Database
remarks: whois -h whois.nic.or.kr
mnt-by: MNT-KRNIC-AP
remarks: This information has been partially mirrored by APNIC from
remarks: KRNIC. To obtain more specific information, please use the
remarks: KRNIC whois server at whois.krnic.net.
changed: hostmaster@nic.or.kr 20040802
source: KRNIC
person: IP Administrator
descr: Hanaro Telecom Inc.
descr: Shindongah Bldg., 43 Taepyeongno2-Ga Jung-Gu
descr: SEOUL
descr: 100-733
country: KR
phone: +82-2-106-2
fax-no: +82-2-6266-6483
e-mail: ip-adm@hanaro.com
nic-hdl: IA11935-KR
mnt-by: MNT-KRNIC-AP
remarks: This information has been partially mirrored by APNIC from
remarks: KRNIC. To obtain more specific information, please use the
remarks: KRNIC whois server at whois.krnic.net.
changed: hostmaster@nic.or.kr 20040802
source: KRNIC
person: IP Manager
descr: Hanaro Telecom Inc.
descr: Shindongah Bldg., 43 Taepyeongno2-Ga Jung-Gu
descr: SEOUL
descr: 100-733
country: KR
phone: +82-2-106-2
fax-no: +82-2-6266-6483
e-mail: ip-adm@hanaro.com
nic-hdl: IM11881-KR
mnt-by: MNT-KRNIC-AP
remarks: This information has been partially mirrored by APNIC from
remarks: KRNIC. To obtain more specific information, please use the
remarks: KRNIC whois server at whois.krnic.net.
changed: hostmaster@nic.or.kr 20040802
source: KRNIC
Hope this clarifies things,
cheers,
Anne
--
=========
08/16/04 07:07:39 Fast traceroute 222.233.52.27
Trace 222.233.52.27 ...
1 10.84.224.1 19ms 12ms 13ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
2 68.2.4.73 12ms 11ms 10ms TTL: 0 (ip68-2-4-73.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
3 68.2.0.37 12ms 12ms 14ms TTL: 0 (ip68-2-0-37.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
4 68.2.0.113 14ms 14ms 15ms TTL: 0 (ip68-2-0-113.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
5 68.2.14.13 48ms 15ms 14ms TTL: 0 (chnddsrc02-gew0303.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
6 68.1.0.168 17ms 28ms 16ms TTL: 0 (chndbbrc02-pos0101.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
7 64.154.128.29 14ms 17ms 28ms TTL: 0 (p1-0.hsa1.phx1.bbnplanet.net ok)
8 4.68.113.253 17ms 14ms 18ms TTL: 0 (so-6-2-0.mp2.Phoenix1.Level3.net ok)
9 64.159.1.30 4ms 26ms 24ms TTL: 0 (as-0-0.bbr1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
10 209.247.9.214 25ms 27ms 26ms TTL: 0 (so-7-0-0.gar1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
11 4.68.127.138 26ms 23ms 25ms TTL: 0 (att-level3-oc48.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
12 12.123.29.6 24ms 27ms 27ms TTL: 0 (tbr2-p012101.la2ca.ip.att.net probable bogus rDNS: No DNS)
13 12.123.199.229 26ms 25ms 22ms TTL: 0 (gar1-p3100.lsnca.ip.att.net probable bogus rDNS: No DNS)
14 12.119.138.38 25ms 24ms 25ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
15 210.180.97.21 1091ms 1219ms 828ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
16 210.220.73.2 105ms 86ms 50ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
17 211.108.63.146 96ms 96ms 76ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
18 221.139.106.58 93ms 63ms 67ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
19 222.233.52.27 75ms 94ms 76ms TTL: 49 (No rDNS)
======
Consider this traceroute that I took several minutes ago, Hop #14 is ATT, Hop #15 is dark space. Please check the date (against the date of the traceroute later in this email trail), ATT has been routing dark space for about 3 weeks now, and they have been notified. Is this an isolated instance? Maybe (hopefully). But they have not been very proactive on this one particular address.
It is also interesting to note the infrastructure this has from hop #15 through hop #19. They are all dark address space, all APNIC IP addresses. I have published this before several weeks ago and nothing has happened.
It has been estimated by various studies that dark space accounts for upwards of 15% of Internet traffic. Some one is routing this traffic - it has an Internet presence. 15% is not insignificant.
Apparently people have found it useful to allocate to themselves whatever space they feel they need. In finding a way to have it routed, essentially provides them with a web presence that does not violate any ISP's APU, since they are not connected in the normal fashion.
I submit that ATT is routing dark address space, nothing is being done about it, it is probably being treated as a cost of doing business, and ATT has been around for a very long time. I do not know the particulars in this specific instance, all I can do is look at the traceroute and the period of time this instance has been active and come to the obvious conclusions. What recourse does APNIC have in regaining control of their unallocated IP address that is currently being used?
ATT is essentially providing value to the people using this dark address space, at the expense of everyone.
It might be interesting to find out the following:
- Through a random survey of unallocated APNIC addresses, how many
are being used?
- Who is routing them?
- How did they become to be routed?
- What process can be created to have the addresses returned to
APNIC's control?
- What can be done to prevent their routing in the first place?
Regards,
Gordon
Jeff Williams wrote:
Phillip and all,* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management policy *
I don't for a moment believe that many ISP's are going to implement
any routing policy they did not feel was in their customers best interests
as well as had a hand in determining. If they do and it becomes known
they will not be in business very long.
Philip Smith wrote:
Regards,Hi Izumi, At 16:02 10/08/2004 +0900, Izumi Okutani wrote:I have one additional question, which may be more appropriate to askI think everyone has to implement this policy if it reaches consensus. It
APNIC Secretariat - would NIRs be expected to implement the same
policy once this reaches consensus? I am asking this since we have our
own policy making process within JP, and our process differs depending
on what is expected on NIRs.
will only work if the RIRs & NIRs basically decide what the ISPs can and
cannot route.
And if it is approved in the AP region, it has to be approved in the other
three RIR regions to have any impact at all; unless the proposed policy is
intended to be binding on all routes the member ISPs provide transit to.
Otherwise the miscreants which this policy proposal seeks to freeze out of
the Internet will simply go outside of the region.
As I see it, it will change the membership agreement each LIR has with
APNIC, and the membership of the NIR have with the NIR. Basically giving
the RIRs and NIRs internationally binding legal powers to influence their
members' businesses. A pretty fundamental change in APNIC's existing
address assignment policy, never mind uncharted waters for international
law enforcement wrt the Internet. Which laws does APNIC as an Australian
organisation use to stop an ISP in another country from "illegally
announcing address space"? I'm no lawyer, but seeing the ICC being ignored
by some countries doesn't give me much reason for optimism.
philip
--
* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management policy *Izumi JPNIC From: APNIC Secretariat <secretariat@apnic.net> Subject: [sig-policy] Forwarded reply from Gordon Bader Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 10:16:57 +1000The email below is forwarded to the list on behalf of Gordon Bader. He is
now subscribed to the list.
regards,
APNIC Secretariat.
Date: Fri, 06 Aug 2004 07:15:16 -0700 From: GB <gbader@cox.net> To: Izumi Okutani <izumi@nic.ad.jp> CC: secretariat@apnic.net, sig-policy@apnic.net,sig-policy-chair@apnic.netSubject: Re: [sig-policy] SIG Policy Proposal 'Preventing the routing of
'dark' address space
Good Morning Mr. Okutani and APNIC Secretariat,
Thank you for reading the proposal and your associated questions on
the sig-policy proposal
'Preventing the routing of 'dark' address space'. I have responded in
line using the tag [Response]
below for each one of your concerns. I have also included an example.
Izumi Okutani wrote:
Dear Gordon/APNIC secretariat,
I understand the issue you have raised, but I still can't quite
understand your proposal.
Could you please clarify what specific actions you expect APNIC and
possibily, the community members to take?
I've also added my comments inline.
From: APNIC Secretariat <secretariat@apnic.net>
Subject: [sig-policy] SIG Policy Proposal 'Preventing the routing of
'dark' address spaceDate: Wed, 04 Aug 2004 17:39:27 +1000This proposal is being sent to the mailing list on behalf of Gordon
Bader<gbader@cox.net>. Feedback and comments about this proposal arewelcome onthis mailing list.
regards,
APNIC Secretariat.
---
______________________________________________________________________
prop-023-v001: A proposal to prevent the routing of "dark" address
space
______________________________________________________________________
Proposed by: Gordon Bader
<gbader@cox.net>
Version: 1.0
Date: 4 August 2004
Introduction:
"Dark" address space is unallocated IP address space. Bandwidth
originating from "dark" address space should not be routed at any
level.[Response] - Yes, I am essentially proposing the first at ALL levels ofSummary:Are you proposing ISPs in the community to apply the above policy, or
Bandwidth originating from unallocated IP address space is being
used for SPAM. In addition, unallocated IP address space is being
used to host websites that support SPAM.
APNIC has the ability to grant IP space. Given that ability, it also
has the inherent ability to remove what was granted. The implicit
grant of IP space, carries with it the ability to route, and route
in a "legal" manner. When "illegal" (dark address space) routing is
detected, then the price should be loss of the initial grant - in this
case the ability to operate which carries with it economic measures.
Details:
Routing tables should be configured for non routing (filtering) of
unallocated IP address space as well as allocated IP address space.
Traffic to and from unallocated (or allocated but unused) IP address
space should be dropped as soon as recognized, thus saving bandwidth up
channel.
is this simply an explanation of something which should be done, and
not a part of the proposal?
If it's the first, I think it is out of scope of the address policy.
routing. I do understand that
this would be larger than APNIC's reach and would need to be applied
Internet wide. I am proposing
this be applied to ALL who receive their IP address allocations from
APNIC directly or indirectly.
Included within the proposal are the Tier 1 backbone providers as well
as individual ISP. I have
attached an example of what I am proposing below.
However I do believe that it would be within APNIC's address policy
because if APNIC
was able to initially assign the IP address space to begin with, APNIC
should be able to
remove the address space it originally assigned.
[Response] - The proposal I have submitted proposes the loss of IPEmploy the basic law - what can be given, can be taken away. APNICIf the offending entities are using unallocated address blocks, I'm
should issue a warning first, followed by removal of IP space from the
offending ISP or entity at what ever level. IP addresses are provided
under a contract, thus using contract law, removal is possible.
not sure what you mean by "removal". Would there be anything to remove
if allocations were not made in the first place?
I don't quite understand how APNIC can be invloved in this, and how
effective it would be in addressing the problem. I hope you can
clarify this a little bit more.
address space at the point
where routing "drops off" in to "dark space". Let me provide an actual
traceroute. As of a couple
of minutes ago, node 19 222.233.52.27 was still active. That is 6 days
after this traceroute was
taken.
I received an "Failure to Delivery Notice" for an email that I had not
sent, that was a item of SPAM
that directed the reader to the IP address 222.233.52.27.
===============
07/31/04 16:12:27 Fast traceroute 222.233.52.27
Trace 222.233.52.27 ...
1 10.84.224.1 12ms 13ms 17ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
2 68.2.4.73 11ms 13ms 13ms TTL: 0
(ip68-2-4-73.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
3 68.2.0.37 14ms 11ms 12ms TTL: 0
(ip68-2-0-37.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
4 68.2.0.113 12ms 14ms 15ms TTL: 0
(ip68-2-0-113.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
5 68.2.14.13 14ms 16ms 14ms TTL: 0
(chnddsrc02-gew0303.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
6 68.1.0.168 14ms 15ms 13ms TTL: 0
(chndbbrc02-pos0101.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
7 64.154.128.29 17ms 15ms 16ms TTL: 0
(p1-0.hsa1.phx1.bbnplanet.net ok)
8 4.68.113.253 14ms 17ms 23ms TTL: 0
(so-6-2-0.mp2.Phoenix1.Level3.net ok)
9 64.159.1.30 25ms 25ms 22ms TTL: 0
(as-0-0.bbr1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
10 209.247.9.214 28ms * 25ms TTL: 0
(so-7-0-0.gar1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
11 4.68.127.134 25ms 25ms 31ms TTL: 0
(att-level3-oc48.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
12 12.123.29.2 28ms 27ms 23ms TTL: 0
(tbr1-p014001.la2ca.ip.att.net probable bogus rDNS: No DNS)
13 12.123.199.185 25ms 23ms 26ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
14 12.119.138.38 25ms 25ms 24ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
15 210.180.97.21 181ms 105ms 161ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
16 211.108.90.2 107ms 162ms 140ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
17 211.108.63.138 145ms 171ms 146ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
18 221.139.106.66 130ms 146ms 145ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
19 222.233.52.27 141ms 145ms 94ms TTL: 49 (No rDNS)
=================
You will notice that starting with node 15 the address space is un
allocated. Thus the last
legal space rests with node 14 which now has a problem with their
routing tables.
I am proposing that notification be given (in this case) to
12.119.138.38 "holder" to repair their
routing tables. If not acted upon within a reasonable period of time
and possibly a number
of similiar instances, then the "holder" of the 12.0.0.0 -
12.255.255.255 address space loose
their IP assignment. Yes, I am proposing that in this example, the
POSSIBLY that after 7 days of
inaction after being notified, AT&T WorldNet Services would loose their
IP allocation,
if they received their IP allocation from APNIC. In this case they did
not, and that is why I
do understand that this would need to be adopted Internet wide. I am
also interested to see how
long 222.233.52.27 remains active after this email is sent.
How might this work. There are a number of SPAM services that receive
spam from their users.
They parse the spam extracting the possible originating IP addresses of
the spam, AND the IP addresses
the SPAM is directing the reader to. I am proposing to take the
extracted address the SPAM reader
is sent to, traceroute it, determine the last legal IP address on the
route and send an automated
notification to that service provider, whom ever that may be.
With respect to the question of "removal" of IP address space, I would
propose the logical loss
of routing to the IP address space in question.
I hope I have answered your questions.
Thank you very much,
Gordon
Izumi JPNICPros/Cons: Pros: By adopting this policy, bandwidth utilization will be reduced.Criminalenterprises will no longer be served.
Cons:
Disadvantages include new routing tables of increasing complexity
to handle the non routing issues associated with dark address space
activities and the associated traffic generated.
Effect on APNIC:
Reduction in bandwidth handled and in it's associated rate of growth.
* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management policy
*_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ sig-policy mailing list sig-policy@lists.apnic.net http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy
Samantha Dickinson, Technical Editor <sam@apnic.net>
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre ph +61 7 3858 3100
http://www.apnic.net fx +61 7 3858 3199
______________________________________________________________________
* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource managementpolicy *_______________________________________________ sig-policy mailing list sig-policy@lists.apnic.net http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management policy * _______________________________________________ sig-policy mailing list sig-policy@lists.apnic.net http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy
_______________________________________________
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--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
"Be precise in the use of words and expect precision from others" -
Pierre Abelard
"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
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