Hi Izumi,
At 16:02 10/08/2004 +0900, Izumi Okutani wrote:
I have one additional question, which may be more appropriate to ask
APNIC Secretariat - would NIRs be expected to implement the same
policy once this reaches consensus? I am asking this since we have our
own policy making process within JP, and our process differs depending
on what is expected on NIRs.
I think everyone has to implement this policy if it reaches consensus.
It will only work if the RIRs & NIRs basically decide what the ISPs
can and cannot route.
And if it is approved in the AP region, it has to be approved in the
other three RIR regions to have any impact at all; unless the proposed
policy is intended to be binding on all routes the member ISPs provide
transit to. Otherwise the miscreants which this policy proposal seeks
to freeze out of the Internet will simply go outside of the region.
As I see it, it will change the membership agreement each LIR has with
APNIC, and the membership of the NIR have with the NIR. Basically
giving the RIRs and NIRs internationally binding legal powers to
influence their members' businesses. A pretty fundamental change in
APNIC's existing address assignment policy, never mind uncharted
waters for international law enforcement wrt the Internet. Which laws
does APNIC as an Australian organisation use to stop an ISP in another
country from "illegally announcing address space"? I'm no lawyer, but
seeing the ICC being ignored by some countries doesn't give me much
reason for optimism.
philip
--
Izumi
JPNIC
From: APNIC Secretariat <secretariat@apnic.net>
Subject: [sig-policy] Forwarded reply from Gordon Bader
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 10:16:57 +1000
>
> The email below is forwarded to the list on behalf of Gordon Bader.
He is
> now subscribed to the list.
>
> regards,
>
> APNIC Secretariat.
>
> >Date: Fri, 06 Aug 2004 07:15:16 -0700
> >From: GB <gbader@cox.net>
> >To: Izumi Okutani <izumi@nic.ad.jp>
> >CC: secretariat@apnic.net, sig-policy@apnic.net,
sig-policy-chair@apnic.net
> >Subject: Re: [sig-policy] SIG Policy Proposal 'Preventing the
routing of
> >'dark' address space
> >
> >Good Morning Mr. Okutani and APNIC Secretariat,
> >
> > Thank you for reading the proposal and your associated
questions on
> >the sig-policy proposal
> >'Preventing the routing of 'dark' address space'. I have
responded in
> >line using the tag [Response]
> >below for each one of your concerns. I have also included an
example.
> >
> >Izumi Okutani wrote:
> >
> > >Dear Gordon/APNIC secretariat,
> > >
> > >
> > >I understand the issue you have raised, but I still can't quite
> > >understand your proposal.
> > >
> > >Could you please clarify what specific actions you expect APNIC and
> > >possibily, the community members to take?
> > >
> > >I've also added my comments inline.
> > >
> > >From: APNIC Secretariat <secretariat@apnic.net>
> > >Subject: [sig-policy] SIG Policy Proposal 'Preventing the
routing of
> > 'dark' address
> >space
> > >Date: Wed, 04 Aug 2004 17:39:27 +1000
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >>This proposal is being sent to the mailing list on behalf of
Gordon Bader
> > >><gbader@cox.net>. Feedback and comments about this proposal are
welcome on
> > >>this mailing list.
> > >>
> > >>regards,
> > >>APNIC Secretariat.
> > >>---
> > >>
> > >>
> >
>>______________________________________________________________________
> > >>
> > >>prop-023-v001: A proposal to prevent the routing of "dark" address
> > >> space
> >
>>______________________________________________________________________
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>Proposed by: Gordon Bader
> > >> <gbader@cox.net>
> > >>Version: 1.0
> > >>Date: 4 August 2004
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>Introduction:
> > >>
> > >>"Dark" address space is unallocated IP address space. Bandwidth
> > >>originating from "dark" address space should not be routed at
any level.
> > >>
> > >>Summary:
> > >>
> > >>Bandwidth originating from unallocated IP address space is being
> > >>used for SPAM. In addition, unallocated IP address space is being
> > >>used to host websites that support SPAM.
> > >>
> > >>APNIC has the ability to grant IP space. Given that ability, it
also
> > >>has the inherent ability to remove what was granted. The implicit
> > >>grant of IP space, carries with it the ability to route, and route
> > >>in a "legal" manner. When "illegal" (dark address space)
routing is
> > >>detected, then the price should be loss of the initial grant -
in this
> > >>case the ability to operate which carries with it economic
measures.
> > >>
> > >>Details:
> > >>
> > >>Routing tables should be configured for non routing (filtering) of
> > >>unallocated IP address space as well as allocated IP address
space.
> > >>Traffic to and from unallocated (or allocated but unused) IP
address
> > >>space should be dropped as soon as recognized, thus saving
bandwidth up
> > >>channel.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >Are you proposing ISPs in the community to apply the above
policy, or
> > >is this simply an explanation of something which should be done,
and
> > >not a part of the proposal?
> > >
> > >If it's the first, I think it is out of scope of the address
policy.
> > >
> >[Response] - Yes, I am essentially proposing the first at ALL
levels of
> >routing. I do understand that
> >this would be larger than APNIC's reach and would need to be applied
> >Internet wide. I am proposing
> >this be applied to ALL who receive their IP address allocations from
> >APNIC directly or indirectly.
> >Included within the proposal are the Tier 1 backbone providers as
well
> >as individual ISP. I have
> >attached an example of what I am proposing below.
> >
> >However I do believe that it would be within APNIC's address policy
> >because if APNIC
> >was able to initially assign the IP address space to begin with,
APNIC
> >should be able to
> >remove the address space it originally assigned.
> >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >>Employ the basic law - what can be given, can be taken away. APNIC
> > >>should issue a warning first, followed by removal of IP space
from the
> > >>offending ISP or entity at what ever level. IP addresses are
provided
> > >>under a contract, thus using contract law, removal is possible.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >If the offending entities are using unallocated address blocks, I'm
> > >not sure what you mean by "removal". Would there be anything to
remove
> > >if allocations were not made in the first place?
> > >
> > >I don't quite understand how APNIC can be invloved in this, and how
> > >effective it would be in addressing the problem. I hope you can
> > >clarify this a little bit more.
> > >
> >[Response] - The proposal I have submitted proposes the loss of IP
> >address space at the point
> >where routing "drops off" in to "dark space". Let me provide an
actual
> >traceroute. As of a couple
> >of minutes ago, node 19 222.233.52.27 was still active. That is 6
days
> >after this traceroute was
> >taken.
> >
> >I received an "Failure to Delivery Notice" for an email that I had
not
> >sent, that was a item of SPAM
> >that directed the reader to the IP address 222.233.52.27.
> >
> >===============
> > 07/31/04 16:12:27 Fast traceroute 222.233.52.27
> > Trace 222.233.52.27 ...
> > 1 10.84.224.1 12ms 13ms 17ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> > 2 68.2.4.73 11ms 13ms 13ms TTL: 0
> >(ip68-2-4-73.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
> > 3 68.2.0.37 14ms 11ms 12ms TTL: 0
> >(ip68-2-0-37.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
> > 4 68.2.0.113 12ms 14ms 15ms TTL: 0
> >(ip68-2-0-113.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
> > 5 68.2.14.13 14ms 16ms 14ms TTL: 0
> >(chnddsrc02-gew0303.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
> > 6 68.1.0.168 14ms 15ms 13ms TTL: 0
> >(chndbbrc02-pos0101.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
> > 7 64.154.128.29 17ms 15ms 16ms TTL: 0
> >(p1-0.hsa1.phx1.bbnplanet.net ok)
> > 8 4.68.113.253 14ms 17ms 23ms TTL: 0
> >(so-6-2-0.mp2.Phoenix1.Level3.net ok)
> > 9 64.159.1.30 25ms 25ms 22ms TTL: 0
> >(as-0-0.bbr1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
> > 10 209.247.9.214 28ms * 25ms TTL: 0
> >(so-7-0-0.gar1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
> > 11 4.68.127.134 25ms 25ms 31ms TTL: 0
> >(att-level3-oc48.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
> > 12 12.123.29.2 28ms 27ms 23ms TTL: 0
> >(tbr1-p014001.la2ca.ip.att.net probable bogus rDNS: No DNS)
> > 13 12.123.199.185 25ms 23ms 26ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> > 14 12.119.138.38 25ms 25ms 24ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> > 15 210.180.97.21 181ms 105ms 161ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> > 16 211.108.90.2 107ms 162ms 140ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> > 17 211.108.63.138 145ms 171ms 146ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> > 18 221.139.106.66 130ms 146ms 145ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
> > 19 222.233.52.27 141ms 145ms 94ms TTL: 49 (No rDNS)
> >=================
> >
> >You will notice that starting with node 15 the address space is un
> >allocated. Thus the last
> >legal space rests with node 14 which now has a problem with their
> >routing tables.
> >I am proposing that notification be given (in this case) to
> >12.119.138.38 "holder" to repair their
> >routing tables. If not acted upon within a reasonable period of time
> >and possibly a number
> >of similiar instances, then the "holder" of the 12.0.0.0 -
> >12.255.255.255 address space loose
> >their IP assignment. Yes, I am proposing that in this example, the
> >POSSIBLY that after 7 days of
> >inaction after being notified, AT&T WorldNet Services would loose
their
> >IP allocation,
> >if they received their IP allocation from APNIC. In this case
they did
> >not, and that is why I
> >do understand that this would need to be adopted Internet wide. I am
> >also interested to see how
> >long 222.233.52.27 remains active after this email is sent.
> >
> >How might this work. There are a number of SPAM services that
receive
> >spam from their users.
> >They parse the spam extracting the possible originating IP
addresses of
> >the spam, AND the IP addresses
> >the SPAM is directing the reader to. I am proposing to take the
> >extracted address the SPAM reader
> >is sent to, traceroute it, determine the last legal IP address on the
> >route and send an automated
> >notification to that service provider, whom ever that may be.
> >
> >With respect to the question of "removal" of IP address space, I
would
> >propose the logical loss
> >of routing to the IP address space in question.
> >
> >I hope I have answered your questions.
> >
> >Thank you very much,
> >Gordon
> >
> > >
> > >
> > >Izumi
> > >JPNIC
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >>Pros/Cons:
> > >>
> > >>Pros:
> > >>By adopting this policy, bandwidth utilization will be reduced.
> >Criminal
> > >>enterprises will no longer be served.
> > >>
> > >>Cons:
> > >>Disadvantages include new routing tables of increasing complexity
> > >>to handle the non routing issues associated with dark address
space
> > >>activities and the associated traffic generated.
> > >>
> > >>Effect on APNIC:
> > >>
> > >>Reduction in bandwidth handled and in it's associated rate of
growth.
> > >>
> > >>* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management
policy
> > *
> > >>_______________________________________________
> > >>sig-policy mailing list
> > >>sig-policy@lists.apnic.net
> > >>http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
>
>______________________________________________________________________
> >
> >Samantha Dickinson, Technical Editor <sam@apnic.net>
> >Asia Pacific Network Information Centre ph +61 7 3858
3100
> >http://www.apnic.net fx +61 7 3858 3199
>
>______________________________________________________________________
>
> * sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management
policy *
> _______________________________________________
> sig-policy mailing list
> sig-policy@lists.apnic.net
> http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy
>
>
* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management
policy *
_______________________________________________
sig-policy mailing list
sig-policy@lists.apnic.net
http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy
* sig-policy: APNIC SIG on resource management
policy *
_______________________________________________
sig-policy mailing list
sig-policy@lists.apnic.net
http://mailman.apnic.net/mailman/listinfo/sig-policy
