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Re: [sig-policy] Forwarded reply from Gordon Bader



Hello Izumi,

I would like to sincerely apologize to you, for addressing you in a prior responses as Mr.Okutani. I did not realize and I did it out of habit. Obviously my Japanese is not nearly as polished as your English.

Again, my apologies.

With warm regards,
Gordon

Izumi Okutani wrote:

Thanks for the clarification Philip.

OK, I see that this proposal would not be effective unless it is
implemented globally, i.e, should be applied to NIR communities as
well.

I am currently seeking for comments on our ML as well, so get back to
this ML with more comments.

Izumi JPNIC

From: Philip Smith <pfs@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [sig-policy] Forwarded reply from Gordon Bader
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 09:54:21 +1000


Hi Izumi,

At 16:02 10/08/2004 +0900, Izumi Okutani wrote:


I have one additional question, which may be more appropriate to ask
APNIC Secretariat - would NIRs be expected to implement the same
policy once this reaches consensus? I am asking this since we have our
own policy making process within JP, and our process differs depending
on what is expected on NIRs.

I think everyone has to implement this policy if it reaches consensus. It will only work if the RIRs & NIRs basically decide what the ISPs can and cannot route.

And if it is approved in the AP region, it has to be approved in the other three RIR regions to have any impact at all; unless the proposed policy is intended to be binding on all routes the member ISPs provide transit to. Otherwise the miscreants which this policy proposal seeks to freeze out of the Internet will simply go outside of the region.

As I see it, it will change the membership agreement each LIR has with APNIC, and the membership of the NIR have with the NIR. Basically giving the RIRs and NIRs internationally binding legal powers to influence their members' businesses. A pretty fundamental change in APNIC's existing address assignment policy, never mind uncharted waters for international law enforcement wrt the Internet. Which laws does APNIC as an Australian organisation use to stop an ISP in another country from "illegally announcing address space"? I'm no lawyer, but seeing the ICC being ignored by some countries doesn't give me much reason for optimism.

philip
--




Izumi
JPNIC

From: APNIC Secretariat <secretariat@apnic.net>
Subject: [sig-policy] Forwarded reply from Gordon Bader
Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 10:16:57 +1000


The email below is forwarded to the list on behalf of Gordon Bader. He is
now subscribed to the list.

regards,

APNIC Secretariat.


Date: Fri, 06 Aug 2004 07:15:16 -0700
From: GB <gbader@cox.net>
To: Izumi Okutani <izumi@nic.ad.jp>
CC: secretariat@apnic.net, sig-policy@apnic.net,
sig-policy-chair@apnic.net

Subject: Re: [sig-policy] SIG Policy Proposal 'Preventing the routing of
'dark' address space

Good Morning Mr. Okutani and APNIC Secretariat,

Thank you for reading the proposal and your associated questions on
the sig-policy proposal
'Preventing the routing of 'dark' address space'. I have responded in
line using the tag [Response]
below for each one of your concerns. I have also included an example.

Izumi Okutani wrote:


Dear Gordon/APNIC secretariat,


I understand the issue you have raised, but I still can't quite
understand your proposal.

Could you please clarify what specific actions you expect APNIC and
possibily, the community members to take?

I've also added my comments inline.

From: APNIC Secretariat <secretariat@apnic.net>
Subject: [sig-policy] SIG Policy Proposal 'Preventing the routing of

'dark' address
space

Date: Wed, 04 Aug 2004 17:39:27 +1000




This proposal is being sent to the mailing list on behalf of Gordon
Bader

<gbader@cox.net>. Feedback and comments about this proposal are
welcome on

this mailing list.

regards,
APNIC Secretariat.
---


______________________________________________________________________

prop-023-v001: A proposal to prevent the routing of "dark" address
space
______________________________________________________________________


Proposed by: Gordon Bader
<gbader@cox.net>
Version: 1.0
Date: 4 August 2004


Introduction:

"Dark" address space is unallocated IP address space. Bandwidth
originating from "dark" address space should not be routed at any
level.

Summary:

Bandwidth originating from unallocated IP address space is being
used for SPAM. In addition, unallocated IP address space is being
used to host websites that support SPAM.

APNIC has the ability to grant IP space. Given that ability, it also
has the inherent ability to remove what was granted. The implicit
grant of IP space, carries with it the ability to route, and route
in a "legal" manner. When "illegal" (dark address space) routing is
detected, then the price should be loss of the initial grant - in this
case the ability to operate which carries with it economic measures.

Details:

Routing tables should be configured for non routing (filtering) of
unallocated IP address space as well as allocated IP address space.
Traffic to and from unallocated (or allocated but unused) IP address
space should be dropped as soon as recognized, thus saving bandwidth up
channel.



Are you proposing ISPs in the community to apply the above policy, or
is this simply an explanation of something which should be done, and
not a part of the proposal?

If it's the first, I think it is out of scope of the address policy.


[Response] - Yes, I am essentially proposing the first at ALL levels of
routing. I do understand that
this would be larger than APNIC's reach and would need to be applied
Internet wide. I am proposing
this be applied to ALL who receive their IP address allocations from
APNIC directly or indirectly.
Included within the proposal are the Tier 1 backbone providers as well
as individual ISP. I have
attached an example of what I am proposing below.

However I do believe that it would be within APNIC's address policy
because if APNIC
was able to initially assign the IP address space to begin with, APNIC
should be able to
remove the address space it originally assigned.




Employ the basic law - what can be given, can be taken away. APNIC
should issue a warning first, followed by removal of IP space from the
offending ISP or entity at what ever level. IP addresses are provided
under a contract, thus using contract law, removal is possible.



If the offending entities are using unallocated address blocks, I'm
not sure what you mean by "removal". Would there be anything to remove
if allocations were not made in the first place?

I don't quite understand how APNIC can be invloved in this, and how
effective it would be in addressing the problem. I hope you can
clarify this a little bit more.


[Response] - The proposal I have submitted proposes the loss of IP
address space at the point
where routing "drops off" in to "dark space". Let me provide an actual
traceroute. As of a couple
of minutes ago, node 19 222.233.52.27 was still active. That is 6 days
after this traceroute was
taken.

I received an "Failure to Delivery Notice" for an email that I had not
sent, that was a item of SPAM
that directed the reader to the IP address 222.233.52.27.

===============
07/31/04 16:12:27 Fast traceroute 222.233.52.27
Trace 222.233.52.27 ...
1 10.84.224.1 12ms 13ms 17ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
2 68.2.4.73 11ms 13ms 13ms TTL: 0
(ip68-2-4-73.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
3 68.2.0.37 14ms 11ms 12ms TTL: 0
(ip68-2-0-37.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
4 68.2.0.113 12ms 14ms 15ms TTL: 0
(ip68-2-0-113.ph.ph.cox.net ok)
5 68.2.14.13 14ms 16ms 14ms TTL: 0
(chnddsrc02-gew0303.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
6 68.1.0.168 14ms 15ms 13ms TTL: 0
(chndbbrc02-pos0101.rd.ph.cox.net ok)
7 64.154.128.29 17ms 15ms 16ms TTL: 0
(p1-0.hsa1.phx1.bbnplanet.net ok)
8 4.68.113.253 14ms 17ms 23ms TTL: 0
(so-6-2-0.mp2.Phoenix1.Level3.net ok)
9 64.159.1.30 25ms 25ms 22ms TTL: 0
(as-0-0.bbr1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
10 209.247.9.214 28ms * 25ms TTL: 0
(so-7-0-0.gar1.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
11 4.68.127.134 25ms 25ms 31ms TTL: 0
(att-level3-oc48.LosAngeles1.Level3.net ok)
12 12.123.29.2 28ms 27ms 23ms TTL: 0
(tbr1-p014001.la2ca.ip.att.net probable bogus rDNS: No DNS)
13 12.123.199.185 25ms 23ms 26ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
14 12.119.138.38 25ms 25ms 24ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
15 210.180.97.21 181ms 105ms 161ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
16 211.108.90.2 107ms 162ms 140ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
17 211.108.63.138 145ms 171ms 146ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
18 221.139.106.66 130ms 146ms 145ms TTL: 0 (No rDNS)
19 222.233.52.27 141ms 145ms 94ms TTL: 49 (No rDNS)
=================

You will notice that starting with node 15 the address space is un
allocated. Thus the last
legal space rests with node 14 which now has a problem with their
routing tables.
I am proposing that notification be given (in this case) to
12.119.138.38 "holder" to repair their
routing tables. If not acted upon within a reasonable period of time
and possibly a number
of similiar instances, then the "holder" of the 12.0.0.0 -
12.255.255.255 address space loose
their IP assignment. Yes, I am proposing that in this example, the
POSSIBLY that after 7 days of
inaction after being notified, AT&T WorldNet Services would loose their
IP allocation,
if they received their IP allocation from APNIC. In this case they did
not, and that is why I
do understand that this would need to be adopted Internet wide. I am
also interested to see how
long 222.233.52.27 remains active after this email is sent.

How might this work. There are a number of SPAM services that receive
spam from their users.
They parse the spam extracting the possible originating IP addresses of
the spam, AND the IP addresses
the SPAM is directing the reader to. I am proposing to take the
extracted address the SPAM reader
is sent to, traceroute it, determine the last legal IP address on the
route and send an automated
notification to that service provider, whom ever that may be.

With respect to the question of "removal" of IP address space, I would
propose the logical loss
of routing to the IP address space in question.

I hope I have answered your questions.

Thank you very much,
Gordon


Izumi
JPNIC





Pros/Cons:

Pros:
By adopting this policy, bandwidth utilization will be reduced.

Criminal

enterprises will no longer be served.

Cons:
Disadvantages include new routing tables of increasing complexity
to handle the non routing issues associated with dark address space
activities and the associated traffic generated.

Effect on APNIC:

Reduction in bandwidth handled and in it's associated rate of growth.

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______________________________________________________________________

Samantha Dickinson, Technical Editor <sam@apnic.net>
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre ph +61 7 3858 3100
http://www.apnic.net fx +61 7 3858 3199
______________________________________________________________________

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